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Chapter 2
Probability and Time Symmetry in Classical
Markov Processes
Guido Bacciagaluppi
2.1 Introduction
The problem of the arrow of time in physics is that certain phenomena appear
systematically to take place much more frequently than their time reversals, and
this despite the fact that the fundamental laws are mostly believed to be fully time-
symmetric, at least as long as they are deterministic. The two common general
strategies for addressing this problem use, respectively, time-asymmetric laws or
time-symmetric laws with special initial or boundary conditions.
It is less clear that such a problem exists also if one assumes indeterministic
laws, since, intuitively, probabilities may be thought of as intrinsically time-directed.
However, one should distinguish sharply between issues in the interpretation of
probability, where these intuitions are strongest (‘open future’ versus ‘fixed past’),
and issues of formalism, which are the only ones involved in the description of the
phenomena (can time-directed behaviour be described by formally time-symmetric
laws?).
In this paper we propose to investigate, in the simple abstract setting of discrete
Markov processes (more precisely, Markov processes with discrete state space and
continuous time), whether and in what sense time-directed behaviour might indeed
be compatible with time-symmetric probabilistic laws. We shall argue that time-
symmetric stochastic processes, in a classical setting, are indeed quite capable of
describing time-directed behaviour (or, when otherwise, that the remaining time
asymmetry is quite benign). Thus, we suggest that a move to indeterministic laws
is not likely to change the terms of the debate on the arrow of time. There will
still be two fundamental alternatives for describing time-directed behaviour: adopt-
ing time-asymmetric laws, or adopting time-symmetric laws and suitable boundary
conditions.1
G. Bacciagaluppi (B)
Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
e-mail: guido.bacciagaluppi@arts.usyd.edu.au
1Note that Markov processes are indeed sometimes used in the context of thermodynamics to
explain the thermodynamic arrow in terms of a ‘probabilistic arrow of time’. Uffink (2007,
41M. Suárez (ed.), Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics, Synthese Library
347, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9904-5_2, C© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
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42 G. Bacciagaluppi
On the basis of these results we then argue that considering the arrow of time in
a probabilistic setting fails to justify a qualitative distinction in status between the
future and the past. Of course, investigating notions of time symmetry or asymmetry
at the level of the formalism can yield no normative conclusion about the interpre-
tation of probability. However, we take it that it can provide useful guidelines for
choosing or constructing a good interpretation, and in this sense we suggest that the
common interpretation of probabilities as time-directed is unjustified.
Our results apply to classical probabilities. In a separate paper (Bacciagaluppi,
2007), we discuss the case of quantum probabilities as they appear in no-collapse
approaches to quantum mechanics, specifically in the context of the decoherent
histories formalism of quantum mechanics. The conclusions drawn in the two
papers are quite different. Whereas in the classical case we shall argue against
drawing such distinctions, in the quantum case we find that, albeit in a restricted
sense, a qualitative distinction between forwards and backwards probabilities can
be justified.
The structure of this paper is as follows: after reviewing some elementary the-
ory in Section 2.2, we shall discuss notions of time symmetry for discrete Markov
processes in Section 2.3. Then, in Section 2.4, we shall review reasons given for a
time-asymmetric treatment of probabilities (Section 2.4.1); argue that, contrary to
appearances, the relevant examples can very well be treated using processes that are
time-symmetric or only harmlessly time-asymmetric (Section 2.4.2); and, finally,
draw lessons for the interpretation of probability (Section 2.4.3).
2.2 A Few Essentials About Markov Processes
A stochastic process is defined to be a family of random variables, indexed by t,
from a probability space Ω to a (common) state space S, which for the purposes of
this paper we shall assume to be discrete (and sometimes finite):
X(t, .) : "→ S . (2.1)
It is, however, simpler to discuss a stochastic process in terms of joint distributions
at finitely many times. Indeed, a classic theorem by Kolmogorov (1931) states that a
stochastic process can be reconstructed from the collection of its finite-dimensional
distributions, the n-fold joint distributions for all n:
pi1i2...in (t1, t2, . . . , tn) . (2.2)
We shall also assume that the process is Markov, i.e. for any t1 < t2 < . . . <
tj < tj+1 < . . . < tn,
Section 7) has independently criticised such attempts in a way that is very close to the ideas
expressed in this paper.
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2 Probability and Time Symmetry in Classical Markov Processes 43
pij+1...in|i1...ij(tj+1, . . . , tn|t1, . . . , tj) = pij+1...in|ij(tj+1, . . . , tn|tj) , (2.3)
i.e.
pi1...in(t1, . . . , tn)
pi1...ij(t1, . . . , tj)
= pij...in(t1, . . . , tn)
pij (tn)
. (2.4)
The finite-dimensional distributions of a Markov process can be reconstructed from
its two-dimensional distributions,
pij(t, s) , (2.5)
as is easily shown by induction. It should also be noted that the Markov condition is
only apparently time-directed. Indeed, (2.4) is equivalent to
pi1...in (t1, . . . , tn)
pij...in(tj, . . . , tn)
= pi1...ij (t1, . . . , tj)
pij(tj)
, (2.6)
i.e.
pi1...ij−1|ij...in (t1, . . . , tj−1|tj, . . . , tn) = pi1...ij−1|ij(t1, . . . , tj−1|tj) , (2.7)
so that the Markov condition is itself still perfectly time-symmetric.
Now we can introduce (two-time) transition probabilities. That is, for t > s we
define:
pi|j(t|s) := pij(t, s)pj(s) (2.8)
(forwards transition probabilities), and
pi|j(s|t) := pij(s, t)pj(t) =
pji(t, s)
pj(t)
(2.9)
(backwards transition probabilities).
Using the forwards transition probabilities we can express the time evolution of
the single-time distributions as
pi(t) =
∑
j
pi|j(t|s)pj(s) , (2.10)
which we can also write in more compact form as
p(t) = P(t|s)p(s) . (2.11)
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44 G. Bacciagaluppi
P(t|s) is called the transition matrix, mapping the probability vector p(s) into p(t).
The matrix P(t|s) is a so-called stochastic matrix, i.e. all elements of P(t|s) are
between 0 and 1, and each column of P(t|s) sums to 1.
Similarly, we have the time-reversed analogues of (2.10) and (2.11):
pi(s) =
∑
j
pi|j(s|t)pj(t) , (2.12)
and
p(s) = P(s|t)p(t) . (2.13)
Note that the backwards transition matrix P(s|t) is not in general the inverse matrix
P(t|s)−1, as can be seen easily by noting that the former is always well-defined, via
(2.9), but the latter is not: e.g. if for given t and s,
P(t|s) =
(
1− ε α
ε 1− α
)
, (2.14)
invertibility rules out the case α = 1− ε.AQ1
The intuitive reason for this discrepancy is that, given (2.8) and (2.9), p(s) is
not in general specifiable independently of both P(t|s) and P(s|t). Therefore, the
condition that for all s and t,
p(s) = P(s|t)P(t|s)p(s) , (2.15)
does not imply
P(s|t)P(t|s) = 1 , (2.16)
because p(s) in (2.15) is not arbitrary.
Now, let us take two possibly different initial distributions and evolve them both
in time using the same (forwards) transition probabilities. It is then elementary to
show that∑
i
|pi(t)− qi(t)| =
∑
i
∣∣∣∑
j
pi|j(t|s)pj(s)−
∑
j
pi|j(t|s)qj(s)
∣∣∣
≤∑
i
∑
j
|pi|j(t|s)||pj(s)− qj(s)|
= ∑
j
|pj(s)− qj(s)| .
(2.17)
It follows that
∑
i |pi(t)− qi(t)| converges to some positive number, not necessarily
zero. Under suitable conditions, in particular if there are ‘enough’ transitions, one
can hope to strengthen this result to
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2 Probability and Time Symmetry in Classical Markov Processes 45
lim
t→∞
∑
j
|pj(t)− qj(t)| = 0 , (2.18)
i.e. any two distributions would converge asymptotically. Under appropriate condi-
tions, there would even be convergence of any initial distribution towards a unique
(time-independent) limit distribution.
‘Limit theorems’, or ‘ergodic theorems’ for discrete Markov processes describe
precisely the asymptotic properties of processes with a given set of (forwards) tran-
sition probabilities, in particular the circumstances under which such processes
converge to a limit (uniquely or non-uniquely), and the relevant notion and cor-
responding speed of convergence. Analogous results hold, of course, if one fixes the
set of backwards transition probabilities.2
Let us define state j to be a consequent of state i, if for all times s with pi(s) &= 0
there is a t > s such that pj|i(t|s) &= 0. A state i is transient iff there is a state j that
is a consequent of i, but such that i is not a consequent of j. The relation of con-
sequence defines equivalence classes on the non-transient states (so-called ergodic
classes).
In the case of finitely many states a sufficient condition for the existence of an
(invariant) limit distribution for t →∞ is that the (forwards) transition probabilities
are time-translation invariant – synonyms: if the (forwards) transition probabilities
are stationary, or if the process is (forwards) homogeneous. The limit distribution
decomposes into a convex combination of the limit distributions on each ergodic
class, while the probability of any transient state converges to zero (see e.g. Doob,
1953, Chapter VI). In the next section and the appendix, we shall need to refer to
the case of discrete time, where the result is slightly weaker, since in some ergodic
classes one may have cyclic behaviour rather than convergence (see e.g. Doob, 1953,
Chapter V).
Returning to the case of continuous time, if one has denumerably many states,
homogeneity is not sufficient for the existence of limit distributions, and additional
conditions can be used. On the other hand, homogeneity is not a necessary condition
either for the existence of limit distributions, and alternative sufficient conditions
are known. As an example, take a two-state process that has equal probabilities for
jumping from 0 to 1 as from 1 to 0 in any given time interval, and such that in unit
time these probabilities are always larger than a given δ. Then one can easily see
that the process will converge exponentially fast towards the invariant distribution
p0(t) = p1(t) = 1/2, whether or not the transition probabilities are time translation
invariant. Similarly, there are conditions that ensure asymptotic convergence when
the process has no invariant limit distribution (see e.g. Hajnal, 1958).
If the single-time distribution pi(t) of a process is invariant, it is itself equal to the
limit distribution of the process, and we shall say that the process is in equilibrium.
2For a good introduction to the complex theme of ergodic theory in the deterministic case, see
Uffink (2007, Section 6).
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(We shall occasionally also refer to an invariant distribution as an equilibrium dis-
tribution.) Note that if a process is in equilibrium, it has no transient states. Finally,
a process that is both homogeneous and in equilibrium is said to be stationary.
2.3 Definitions of Time Symmetry
The framework we have introduced above is quite austere, and we must realise
that, at least for the purpose of investigating time symmetry, it has its limitations.
For instance, we do not have enough structure to define the time reverse of a
state (there is no analogue of inversion of momenta in Newtonian mechanics, for
instance). More importantly, we are not going to be able to identify and abstract
from systematic components of the process, in particular components that may
appear time-asymmetric but might in fact be generated by some time-symmetric
law (think of a diffusion process taking place in a Newtonian gravitational field).
Nevertheless, the insights we shall gain will be enough to discuss how typical
examples of time-directed behaviour can be described in terms of time-symmetric
processes, and to provide clues as to the time-symmetric or time-asymmetric status
of the probabilities with respect to their interpretation.
It is natural to consider transition probabilities as what defines the dynamics of a
system described by a Markov process. This in turn suggests to consider the follow-
ing condition as a possible condition for a time-symmetric process: that forwards
and backwards transition probabilities coincide, i.e. (for all i, j, t and s)
pi|j(t|s) = pi|j(s|t) (2.19)
or (for all t, s)
P(t|s) = P(s|t) . (2.20)
This is by analogy to the condition, familiar from the deterministic case, that the
backwards equations of motion have the same form as the forwards equations.
In the literature on Markov processes, however, the usual condition of time
symmetry is the so-called condition of detailed balance3:
pi|j(t|s)pj(s) = pj|i(t|s)pi(s) . (2.21)
The meaning of detailed balance can be readily seen using the notion of proba-
bility current, i.e. the net probability flow from a state j to a state i between s and t:
jij(t, s) := pi|j(t|s)pj(s)− pj|i(t|s)pi(s) . (2.22)
3My thanks to Werner Ehm for discussions about this notion.
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2 Probability and Time Symmetry in Classical Markov Processes 47
Detailed balance simply means that there are no probability currents.
Our main purpose in this section will be to see that the two conditions (2.19)
and (2.21) are equivalent, at least under certain conditions. Note that (2.21) is often
formulated under the additional presupposition that the process is stationary, but we
shall not make this assumption.
Symmetry of the transition probabilities obviously involves both forwards and
backwards transition probabilities, while detailed balance explicitly involves only
the forwards transition probabilities. On the other hand,
jij(t, s) = pij(t, s)− pji(t, s)
= pij(t, s)− pij(s, t) , (2.23)
therefore detailed balance is equivalent to symmetry of the two-time distributions,
pij(t, s) = pij(s, t) , (2.24)
which is clearly a time symmetry condition.
Now, (2.24) and hence detailed balance are easily seen to be a sufficient con-
dition for both equilibrium and the symmetry of transition probabilities (2.19).
Indeed, performing a sum over i in (2.24) yields invariance of the single-time
distributions:
pj(s) = pj(t) , (2.25)
i.e. equilibrium. But from (2.24) and (2.25) we obtain:
pi|j(t|s) = pij(t, s)pj(s) =
pij(s, t)
pj(s)
= pij(s, t)
pj(t)
= pi|j(s|t) , (2.26)
i.e. (2.19), as long as either side is well-defined.
Notice that, conversely, (2.19) and equilibrium together imply (2.24) and there-
fore detailed balance. Indeed,
pij(t, s) = pi|j(t|s)pj(s)
= pi|j(s|t)pj(s)
= pi|j(s|t)pj(t) = pij(s, t) .
(2.27)
Instead, equilibrium on its own does not imply detailed balance (and therefore
not symmetry of transition probabilities either). Indeed, take a three-state system
with
P(t|s) =
 1/3 1/6 1/21/2 1/3 1/6
1/6 1/2 1/3
t−s
. (2.28)
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We have in particular that
pi|i(t + 1|t) = 1/3 ,
pi+1|i(t + 1|t) = 1/2 ,
pi−1|i(t + 1|t) = 1/6
(2.29)
(where i+1 and i−1 are to be read as addition mod 3). The equilibrium distribution
for this process is pi(t) = 1/3, but there is clearly a non-zero current 0 → 1 → 2 →
0, and detailed balance fails.
This example is generic in the sense that the only way to have currents in equi-
librium, whether for finite or denumerable state space, is to have a circular current,
i.e. a current along a closed chain of states with at least three members,4
i → j → k → i . (2.30)
Therefore equilibrium and zero circular currents together are equivalent to detailed
balance. In the special case of a two-state system, there are no three-element chains,
and equilibrium is in fact equivalent to detailed balance.
Simple examples suggest that, under suitable conditions, symmetry of the transi-
tion probabilities (2.19) might in fact imply equilibrium and therefore (by (2.27))
be equivalent to detailed balance. Take a homogeneous two-state process with
(forwards) transition matrix
P(t|s) =
(
1− α ε
α 1− ε
)t−s
. (2.31)
If we take α &= 0 and ε arbitrary, this is a toy model of decay (with non-zero
probability α of decay in unit time), with or without re-excitation (depending on
whether ε &= 0 of ε = 0).
Imposing (2.19) in this example leads to
p0(t) = α
α + ε , p1(t) =
ε
α + ε (2.32)
for all t, i.e. the single-time distribution is fully constrained to be the equilibrium
distribution of the process (and the process is stationary).
4In the case of denumerable state space, assume there are non-zero currents in equilibrium but
no circular currents. Let us say that, between s and t, state 0 gains probability ε from states
1, . . . , i1 (distinct from 0). Obviously,
∑i1
i=1 pi(s) ≥ ε. In the same time interval, the states 1, . . . , i1
must gain probability at least ε from some states i1 + 1, . . . , i2 (all distinct from 0, . . . , i1), and∑i2
i=i1+1 pi(s) ≥ ε. Therefore
∑i2
i=1 pi(s) ≥ 2ε. Repeat the argument until
∑in
i=1 pi(s) ≥ nε > 1,
which is impossible.
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Indeed, for arbitrary t and s define αt−s and εt−s such that
P(t|s) =
(
1− αt−s εt−s
αt−s 1− εt−s
)
. (2.33)
Then, from
p0|1(t|s) = p0|1(s|t) = αt−s (2.34)
and
p1|0(t|s) = p1|0(s|t) = εt−s , (2.35)
one obtains
εt−sp0(s) = αt−sp1(t) , (2.36)
εt−sp0(t) = αt−sp1(s) . (2.37)
Thus, since there are only two states,
εt−sp0(s) = αt−s(1− p0(t)) , (2.38)
εt−sp0(t) = αt−s(1− p0(s)) , (2.39)
whence
p0(s) = p0(t) = αt−s
αt−s + εt−s . (2.40)
Therefore, p0(t) is constant, since t and s are arbitrary. Finally, substituting s = t−1
in (2.40), we have
p0(t) = α
α + ε , (2.41)
and the claim follows.
We now ask for conditions under which symmetry of the transition probabilities
strictly implies equilibrium and thus becomes equivalent to detailed balance.
Let us first specialise to homogeneous Markov processes, i.e. the transition
probabilities are time-translation invariant. Then equilibrium follows very easily.
(Incidentally, note that a forwards or backwards homogeneous process satisfying
(2.19) will be both forwards and backward homogeneous.) Indeed, for all t, s,
p(t + s) = P(t + s|t + s/2)P(t + s/2|t)p(t) . (2.42)
By translation invariance,
p(t + s) = P(t + s/2|t)P(t + s/2|t)p(t) , (2.43)
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and by symmetry
p(t + s) = P(t|t + s/2)P(t + s/2|t)p(t) , (2.44)
but by definition also
p(t) = P(t|t + s/2)P(t + s/2|t)p(t) . (2.45)
Therefore,
p(t + s) = p(t) (2.46)
for all t, s, i.e. the process is in equilibrium.
If we relax the assumption that the process is homogeneous, it is still a theorem
that (2.19) implies equilibrium, at least under the further assumptions that (a) the
state space has finite size n, and (b) for all i, j and s the transition probabilities pi|j(t|s)
are continuous in t. (The appendix provides an elementary derivation of this result
from the ergodic theorem for discrete time.) Thus, under the appropriate conditions,
the two definitions of time symmetry (2.19) and (2.21) are indeed equivalent.
2.4 Probability and Time Symmetry
2.4.1 Arguments for Asymmetry
Imagine a world in which fundamental laws are probabilistic. Imagine further that
this world contains an arrow of time, that is, typical examples of time-directed
behaviour, and that this behaviour is investigated by observers who can set up exper-
iments under controlled initial conditions (but not final ones). That is, like ourselves,
observers in this world are subject to some macroscopic arrow of time that may or
may not be related to the time-directed behaviour under scrutiny. Finally, let this be
a classical world; in particular, assume that gaining knowledge of the state i of a
system at a certain time (in particular with regard to alternative initial conditions)
can be done in principle without disturbing the system, so that we can still consider
it as governed by the same stochastic process.
It will be tempting to interpret the probabilistic laws in this world as intrinsi-
cally time-directed. Such laws will specify objective probabilities for events in the
future given events in the present (if the laws are Markovian), while probabilities for
past events will be regarded as merely epistemic. The underlying intuition is that,
under indeterminism, the future is genuinely ‘open’, while the past, while perhaps
unknown, is ‘fixed’.
Formally, however, there is a very good argument for saying that in a classi-
cal stochastic process there is no distinction between future and past: a classical
stochastic process is defined as a probability measure over a space of trajectories, so
the formal definition is completely time-symmetric. Transition probabilities towards
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2 Probability and Time Symmetry in Classical Markov Processes 51
the future can be obtained by conditionalising on the past; but, equally, transition
probabilities towards the past can be obtained by conditionalising on the future.
Individual trajectories may exhibit time asymmetry, and there may be a quantitative
asymmetry between forwards and backwards transition probabilities, but at least as
long as the latter are not all 0 or 1, quantitative differences fall short of justifying a
notion of fixed past.
On the other hand, at least in a world as the one sketched above, there are ways
of arguing for qualitative formal differences between forwards and backwards tran-
sitions probabilities that could suggest also a different interpretational status for the
two kinds of probabilities:
(A) In a probabilistic setting one has good ergodic behaviour, in particular, if time
translation invariance of the transition probabilities holds (assuming finiteness
of the state space or other suitable conditions), one will have a tendency for a
stochastic process to equilibrate in time, regardless of the initial distribution.
Such an arrow of time would thus appear to be very deeply seated in the use
of probabilistic concepts. A related argument is that in the homogeneous case
(and, as we have mentioned, more generally) the symmetry of transition prob-
abilities implies equilibrium, and thus rules out not only any equilibration pro-
cess but any time development of the probabilities whatsoever (Sober, 1993).
(B) Another interesting argument for asymmetry between forwards and backwards
probabilities runs along the following lines. Take the simple model of expo-
nential decay (2.31), with probability α of decay from the excited state 1 to the
ground state 0 in unit time, and starting with all ‘atoms’ excited, i.e. . We have:
p0|1(t + 1|t) = α , (2.47)
for all t, but:
p0|1(t|t + 1) =
{→ α for t →∞ ,
→ 0 for t → 0 . (2.48)
In this example, the forwards transition probabilities are time translation invari-
ant, but the backwards transition probabilities are not. This difference has been
used to argue that forwards transition probabilities are indeed law-like, while
backwards transition probabilities are epistemic (Arntzenius, 1995).
(C) Finally, backwards transition probabilities are not invariant across experiments
when one varies the initial distribution. One can thus argue that if the initial dis-
tribution of the process is an epistemic distribution over contingent initial states,
then the backwards transition probabilities cannot be law-like, or not entirely
law-like, because they depend on the epistemic initial distribution. A related
argument is that, in general, at most one set of transition probabilities can be
law-like, otherwise also the single-time probabilities will be, so that it appears
that initial conditions cannot be freely chosen (Watanabe, 1965, Section 5).
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These arguments infer from typical time-directed behaviour to formal qualitative
differences in the transition probabilities. It is this type of inference that we shall
question below. Without a qualitative difference in the formalism, however, we take
it that there is no reason to deny the same interpretational status to both sets of
transition probabilities alike.
2.4.2 Time-Directed Behaviour and Time-Symmetric Probabilities
The situation of convergence to equilibrium – indeed, the simple example of decay –
can be used to exemplify at once all three purported differences between forwards
and backwards transition probabilities and, at least at first sight, seems thus to be
totally intractable in terms of symmetric processes. Indeed, (A) we have seen that
time symmetry of transition probabilities implies equilibrium of the process ((2.32)
above). (B) We have also seen the lack of time translation invariance for the back-
wards transition probabilities ((2.47) and (2.48) above). Finally, (C) if we start with
all ‘atoms’ in the ground state, i.e. p0(0) = 1, we obtain:
p0|1(t + 1|t) = α , (2.49)
for all t, but:
p0|1(t|t + 1) =
{→ α for t →∞ ,
→ 1 for t → 0 . (2.50)
Thus, a different choice of initial condition will indeed lead to different back-
wards transition probabilities.
The question we wish to raise is: can we indeed infer that there are such differ-
ences in the transition probabilities from time asymmetries of the phenomena, i.e.
from the time-directed behaviour of samples?
Obviously, one must distinguish between the transition probabilities of the pro-
cess and the transition frequencies in any actual sample. Observed behaviour, in
particular time-directed behaviour, will always be defined in terms of frequencies,
and in order to conclude from frequencies to probabilities, we have to ensure that the
sample is unbiased. Indeed, suppose that we bias the sample by performing a post-
selection of the final ensemble. Then in general we shall influence the forwards
transition frequencies, in particular destroying their time translation invariance.
If we assume that the process has a limit distribution for t → ∞, a simple
criterion to make sure that the final ensemble is sufficiently unbiased is to check
whether the distribution of the sample is at least approximately time-independent,
i.e. whether or not the sample has been prevented from equilibrating or has subse-
quently departed from equilibrium for any reason (a statistical fluctuation, a final
cause, or an uncooperative lab assistant sneakily post-selecting the ensemble). Only
then will the observed transition frequencies be taken as evidence for any law-like
forwards transition probabilities.
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D 
PR
OO
F
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
2 Probability and Time Symmetry in Classical Markov Processes 53
Estimating backwards transition probabilities should proceed analogously. If we
assume that the process has a limit distribution for t →−∞, then we cannot accept
a sample as unbiased unless the initial distribution of the sample is in fact a limit
distribution of the process. And if we assume that there is no limit distribution
for t → −∞, then we are begging the question, because we have introduced a
qualitative difference between forwards and backwards transition probabilities by
hand.
Thus, while time-symmetric transition probabilities imply invariant equilibrium,
a sample appropriate for estimating both forwards and backwards transition proba-
bilities will be in equilibrium anyway. But now, the above criticisms all rely implic-
itly or explicitly on considering samples other than in equilibrium. Indeed, (A) uses
convergence towards equilibrium (or the possibility of time-dependent distribu-
tions), so cannot be applied if the sample is in equilibrium already; (B) also requires
the use of non-equilibrium ensembles because, trivially, forwards homogeneity and
equilibrium imply backwards homogeneity; finally, (C) relies on considering alter-
native initial conditions, some of which will be non-equilibrium distributions.5 The
idea that convergence to equilibrium could be formally described using a time-
symmetric stochastic process, plus a constraint on the initial distribution of the
specific sample, is thus perfectly viable.
A case apart is provided by samples exhibiting what appear to be transient states.
In the example, this is when we observe decay from the excited state to the ground
state but no re-excitation, which is a case of particularly marked time-directed
behaviour. At first sight, one might think that our argument above applies even in
this case. Indeed, in order to have the forwards transition frequencies match the for-
wards transition probabilities, the sample must be totally decayed at the final time.
By analogy, in order for the backwards transition frequencies to match the back-
wards transition probabilities, the sample must be totally decayed at the initial time
(invariant distribution). But then, the samples exhibiting transience of the excited
state are always biased for the purpose of estimating the backwards transition prob-
abilities. There are two problems, however. Firstly, in a sample that is appropriate
for estimating the transition probabilities in one direction of time, the transition
frequencies in the opposite direction are partially ill-defined: thus, there are no sam-
ples appropriate for estimating both sets of transition probabilities (if such there
be). Secondly and crucially, a non-zero initial frequency for excited states forces
the backwards transition frequencies to be non-zero when the corresponding tran-
sition probabilities (assuming symmetry) should be zero, and thus is clearly not an
allowable constraint.
A better way of treating samples with transient states will be to maintain
that there is in fact a small but non-zero probability of re-excitation, which is
a move analogous to standard reasoning in the deterministic case. (The fact that
5Conditionalising on two different equilibrium distributions (if there are several ergodic classes)
will not yield different backwards transition frequencies, because the transition frequencies are
fixed separately in each ergodic class.
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Julius Caesar was alive and is now dead is not conclusive evidence against the time
symmetry of classical mechanics.)
Recapitulating the above, we have seen that we can describe convergence to equi-
librium using the transition probabilities of a stochastic process in equilibrium plus
an assumption about special initial conditions (with an additional assumption in the
case of apparently transient states). Therefore, the qualitative formal distinctions
between forwards and backwards transition probabilities used as premises in the
criticisms considered above are unwarranted.
We have not shown, however, that convergence to equilibrium can always be
described using time-symmetric transition probabilities, because, other than in the
two-state case, equilibrium is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for time
symmetry. Indeed, there are also examples in which circular currents are called for:
the transition matrices (2.28) above are stationary, so any initial distribution will
converge to equilibrium, but in equilibrium there is a circular current. Intuitively,
the ‘atom’ has a ground state 0 and two excited states 1 and 2, and state 2 decays to
0 directly with much larger probability than via the intermediate state 1. Thus, the
transition probabilities fail to be time-symmetric.6
The import of these asymmetric cases can perhaps be minimised. The asymme-
try appears to be more benign than in the criticisms considered above (e.g. if the
forwards transition probabilities are time translation invariant, so are the backwards
transition probabilities). Indeed, it does not appear that this asymmetry could justify
a qualitative distinction between forwards and backwards transition probabilities.
Furthermore, as briefly mentioned at the beginning of Section 2.3, the framework
we have adopted allows us to describe these currents, but lacks any further structure
that might explain them as determined perhaps by some underlying laws allowing
a fuller analysis as regards time symmetry. Given such structure, the currents might
turn out to be time-symmetric after all, in the sense that they would swap direction
under time reversal of the underlying law.
A related example is provided by the inhomogeneous processes used in Nelson’s
(1966) approach to quantum mechanics. Without going into details, Nelson’s
approach is somewhat similar to the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm, in
that it takes quantum systems (in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics) to
be systems of point particles described in configuration space. Whereas de Broglie
and Bohm take the velocity of the particles to be deterministically determined by the
wave function of the system, Nelson postulates a stochastic process (a diffusion pro-
cess) on the configuration space, and tries to impose conditions that would ensure
that the process is determined in a certain way by the amplitude and phase of a
complex function satisfying the Schrödinger equation. Whether or not Nelson’s con-
ditions achieve this, the process on configuration space definable through the wave
function has as its current velocity the same velocity that arises in pilot-wave the-
ory, which indeed changes sign with the time reversal of the Schrödinger equation.
Thus, both time translation invariance and time symmetry, which are not apparent at
6My thanks to Iain Martel for making this point in conversation.
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the level of the probabilities, are restored by the additional structure provided by the
Schrödinger equation. Note that Nelson’s approach can be adapted to the discrete
case (Guerra and Marra, 1984). In this case the systematic component of the process
is a probability current in the sense of (2.22), which again swaps sign under time
reversal of the Schrödinger equation.7
While our above considerations apply only to processes that admit an invariant
limit distribution, Nelson’s processes generally have only an asymptotic distribution
(also called equivariant), given by the usual quantum distribution |ψ(x, t)|2 (simi-
larly in Guerra and Marra’s approach). We thus see that our considerations can be
generalised to interesting cases of asymptotic convergence. That is, one can describe
asymptotic convergence using a process that is time-symmetric – in the sense that
the only time asymmetry is given by a current that swaps sign under time reversal –
plus special initial conditions.8
2.4.3 Interpretation of Probability
We have tried to characterise the time symmetry of a Markov process in terms of
forwards and backwards transition probabilities. To characterise similarly the inter-
pretation of probabilities means that forwards and backwards transition probabilities
would have the same or a different status. In particular, one could say that the idea of
an (objectively) ‘open future’ and ‘fixed past’ means that forwards transition prob-
abilities are law-like chances, while backwards transition probabilities are merely
epistemic.
To say that both forwards and backwards transition probabilities are law-like
seems less intuitive, since the two sets of probabilities determine the possible single-
time distributions of the process (even uniquely), so the latter would also have to be
taken as law-like. But law-likeness of probability distributions does not mean that
relative frequencies have to always match the given probabilities. As long as an
ensemble is finite, a law-like probability is compatible with infinitely many actual
distributions, and it makes sense to consider constraints on, for instance, initial
distributions or final distributions alongside with the laws. Indeed, the situation is
quite analogous to that in the deterministic case. Deterministic laws determine the
7A more detailed introduction to Nelson’s approach, including an explicit discussion of time sym-
metry and the status of the transition probabilities, is given in Bacciagaluppi (2005). As Nelson’s
approach relates to de Broglie and Bohm’s pilot-wave theory, so Guerra and Marra’s discrete case
relates to the stochastic versions of pilot-wave theory, known as ‘beable’ theories, defined by Bell
(1984).
8Observation in these cases, however, is definitely not classical. If one includes observers in the
description (by adding some appropriate quantum mechanical interaction), when they gain knowl-
edge about the state of the process, thus narrowing their epistemic distribution over the states, they
effectively modify the wave function of the system, thus effectively modifying also the transition
probabilities of the process, both forwards and backwards. (Note that convergence behaviour would
thus be altered if monitored.)
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time development of a system given, for instance, some initial condition; but which
trajectory a system will actually follow is a contingent matter. Similarly, stochastic
laws (whether symmetric or not) can be said to determine, in an appropriate sense,
the time development of a system; but a stochastic process is a probability measure
over a space of trajectories, and which trajectory the system will actually follow
is a contingent matter. If we have a finite ensemble of systems, it is still a contin-
gent matter which trajectories they will follow, regardless of whether the laws are
deterministic or stochastic. (And, in fact, if the stochastic laws are assumed to be
fundamental, then there is ultimately only one system – the universe – and only
one trajectory.) Thus, at least as long as we are not dealing with literally infinite
ensembles, we can make the same distinction between law-like time development
and contingent initial or final states, or distributions over states, in the case of both
deterministic and stochastic laws, and this even if we assume that both forwards and
backwards transition probabilities are law-like, despite the ensuing law-likeness of
single-time distributions.9
We can imagine a stochastic world in which observed transition frequencies typ-
ically show not merely a quantitative but a qualitative difference between forwards
and backwards transition frequencies, as in the examples in Section 2.4.1. However,
our analysis in Section 2.4.2 shows that arguments from observed frequencies
fail to establish an asymmetry between the corresponding probabilities: although
ensembles that are not in equilibrium lead to distorted frequencies, neither the pre-
ponderance of non-equilibrium ensembles in such a world nor any conclusions
drawn on the basis of these frequencies can be arguments against time-symmetric
transition chances (and this despite the fact that equilibrium is a necessary con-
dition for (2.19)). The only serious source of time asymmetry at the level of the
formalism and therefore potential motivation for a time-asymmetric interpretation
would seem to be the presence in some cases of circular currents, which indeed
yield quantitatively asymmetric transition probabilities. However, circular currents
yield no qualitative difference that could justify a different status for forwards and
backwards transition probabilities. In particular, if the only difference between past
and future is the presence of a current in one direction or another along a closed
chain of states, it is difficult to see which of the two directions should correspond to
an open ‘future’ as opposed to a fixed ‘past’. Thus, the possibility of an asymmetry
in terms of circular currents does not seem to be of the kind that would justify a
time-asymmetric interpretation of probability.
9The notion of a constraint is of course more intuitive when one is talking about a subsystem on
which one performs experiments (as in thermodynamics or statistical mecha nics when compress-
ing a gas into a small volume), but it is meant to apply generally. As emphasised by the anonymous
referee, in the case of a stochastic theory such constraints will not only be ‘special’ in some sense
but they will be improbable in the sense specified by the process itself. The further question of
whether and how the contingent trajectories (or distributions) should be explained thus acquires a
new twist as compared to the deterministic case.
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At least in the case of processes with an invariant limit distribution, our analysis
suggests that both forwards and backwards transition probabilities can be considered
law-like. Therefore, whatever approach to the foundations of probabilities one might
take, a time-symmetric interpretation of probabilities appears to be a natural option
in the context of classical Markov processes.
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2.1 Appendix
We now prove that symmetry of the transition probabilities (2.19), together with the
further assumptions that the state space is finite and that the transition probabilities
are continuous, implies equilibrium of the process.
We proceed by induction on the size n of the state space. The case n = 1 is trivial.
Assume that the result has been proved for all sizes 1 ≤ m < n. We now prove it for
n by reductio.
Assume that the single-time distribution is not invariant, i.e.
∃s∃t ≥ s, p(t) = P(t|s)p(s) &= p(s) . (2.51)
For the rest of the proof we now fix such an s.
Since we assume (2.19), i.e. P(t|s) = P(s|t), we also have
p(s) = P(t|s)p(t) , (2.52)
and therefore
P(t|s)2p(s) = p(s) and P(t|s)2p(t) = p(t) . (2.53)
Now fix a time t ≥ s and consider the matrix P := P(t|s)2. This is an n × n
stochastic matrix that we can consider as the transition matrix of a homogeneous
Markov process with discrete time. By (2.53), p(t) and p(s) are both invariant
distributions for this Markov process, and by (2.51) they are different.
By the ergodic theorem for discrete-time Markov processes, existence of at
least two different invariant distributions implies that there are at least two ergodic
classes. Therefore (whether or not there are any transient states), P must have a
block diagonal form
P =
(
P′ 0
0 P′′
)
, (2.54)
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where P′ is an m×m matrix and P′′ an (n−m)×(n−m) matrix, for some 0 < m < n.
For fixed s, P = P(t|s)2 depends on t, and so a priori could m; but in fact m(t)
is independent of t. Indeed, assume there is an m &= m(t) such that for all ε > 0
there is a t′ with |t − t′| < ε and m(t′) = m. The matrix elements of P = P(t|s)2,
in particular the ones off the diagonal blocks, are continuous functions of the transi-
tion probabilities. Therefore, by the continuity of the transition probabilities, P(t|s)2
must also have zeros off the same diagonal blocks, i.e. m = m(t), contrary to
assumption. Therefore, for each m &= m(t) there is an ε(m) > 0 such that for all
t′ with |t − t′| < ε(m) we have m(t′) &= m. Taking the smallest of these finitely
many ε(m) > 0, call it ε0, it follows that m(t′) = m(t) for all t′ in the open ε0-
neighbourhood around t. However, again by the continuity of the matrix elements,
this ε0-neighbourhood is also closed, and therefore it is the entire real line. Since t
was arbitrary, P(t|s)2 has the form (2.54) with the same m for all t ≥ s.
We now focus on the matrix P(t|s) itself rather than on P(t|s)2. Assume that for
some t ≥ s it has some element pk|l(t|s) outside of the m×m and (n−m)× (n−m)
diagonal blocks. In order for P(t|s)2 to have the given block diagonal form, several
other elements of P(t|s) have to be zero, in particular all elements in the k-th column
of P(t|s) that lie inside the corresponding diagonal block.
Since P(t|s) is a stochastic matrix and every column sums to 1, it follows that
already those elements of the k-th column that lie outside the diagonal blocks sum
to 1, and therefore the sum of all elements in the diagonal blocks of P(t|s), call it
d(t), is at most n− 1, i.e.
d(t) = ∑
i,j≤m
pi|j(t|s) +
∑
i,j≥m+1
pi|j(t|s) ≤ n− 1 , (2.55)
for any t ≥ s such that P(t|s) has some element outside of the diagonal blocks. Let
t0 be the infimum of such t. By continuity, we have also
d(t0) ≤ n− 1 . (2.56)
Now, if t0 &= s, then for all t < t0 we have that d(t) = n, but then by continuity
d(t0) = n, contradicting (2.56). If instead t0 = s, since P(s|s) = 1, we again have
d(t0) = n, contradicting (2.56). For all t ≥ s, thus, P(t|s) has the same block diagonal
form as P(t|s)2 with fixed m.
But then, our original Markov process decomposes into two sub-processes, with
state spaces of size m and n − m, respectively. If p(t) &= p(s) (assumption (2.51)),
then the same must be true for at least one of the two sub-processes, but, by the
inductive assumption, this is impossible. Therefore, (2.51) is false and
∀s∀t ≥ s, p(t) = p(s) , (2.57)
QED.
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